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Report on Health Reform Implementation

Essential Health Beneﬁts
and the Affordable Care Act:
Law and Process
Nicholas Bagley
Helen Levy
University of Michigan

Editor’s Note: Thanks to funding from the Blue Shield of California
Foundation and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, JHPPL has
begun the coordination of an Engaged State Health Reform Research
Network to bring together people from different backgrounds (practitioners, stakeholders, and researchers) involved in state-level health
reform implementation to inform and extend health reform across the
United States. A network website will document implementation projects
across the country, workshops will be held, and JHPPL will publish essays
under this new section based on ﬁndings emerging from network participants. All essays in the section will be published open access.
—Colleen M. Grogran

Abstract Starting in 2014, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) will require private
insurance plans sold in the individual and small-group markets to cover a roster of
‘‘essential health beneﬁts.’’ Precisely which beneﬁts should count as essential, however,
was left to the discretion of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The
matter was both important and controversial. Nonetheless, HHS announced its policy
by posting on the Internet a thirteen-page bulletin stating that it would allow each state
to deﬁne essential beneﬁts for itself. On both substance and procedure, the move was
surprising. The state-by-state approach departed from the uniform, federal standard that
the ACA appears to anticipate and that informed observers expected HHS to adopt. And
announcing the policy through an Internet bulletin appeared to allow HHS to sidestep traditional administrative procedures, including notice and comment, immediate
review in the courts, and White House oversight. This article explores two questions.
First, is the state-by-state approach a lawful exercise of HHS’s authority? Second, did
HHS in fact evade the procedural obligations that are meant to shape the exercise of its
discretion?
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Vol. 39, No. 2, April 2014
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The Affordable Care Act (ACA) creates dozens of new programs that
require some kind of implementation at the agency level. By and large, the
regulations governing these new programs have been promulgated through
relatively formal notice-and-comment procedures and subjected to review
coordinated by the Ofﬁce of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).
But the federal agencies implementing the ACA have at times eschewed
notice-and-comment rulemaking even where it might have seemed appropriate. They have instead announced a number of critically important
policies through guidance documents — a broad category that encompasses bulletins, memoranda, and letters to state ofﬁcials. These guidance
documents are typically published not in Federal Register notices but on
agency websites.
This implementation strategy raises questions—perennials in administrative law—about the virtues and vices of substituting guidance for noticeand-comment rulemaking. Does the use of guidance reﬂect the zealous
pursuit of good policy by government ofﬁcials reluctant to get bogged
down in ritualistic bureaucratic exercises? Or does it represent an effort
to avoid the rough-and-tumble of public deliberation over the merits of
particular rules?
We consider this question in the context of a case study. Beginning in
2014, the ACA will require private insurance plans sold in the individual
and small-group markets to cover a roster of ‘‘essential health beneﬁts.’’
Precisely which beneﬁts should count as essential, however, was left to
the discretion of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
The matter was delicate. An expansive bundle of mandatory services would
assure comprehensive coverage, but would also raise the cost of insurance
and could impede efforts to achieve near-universal coverage. Whatever
HHS eventually decided, its choice would ‘‘inﬂuence the nature of coverage available to millions of people in the United States’’ (IOM 2011b: 17).
In December 2011, HHS released its ﬁrst ofﬁcial communication on
essential health beneﬁts: a thirteen-page bulletin posted on the agency’s
website. The bulletin announced HHS’s intention of allowing each state
to deﬁne essential beneﬁts for itself by choosing a ‘‘benchmark’’ plan
modeled on existing plans in the state. The beneﬁts included in that benchmark plan (subject to some adjustments) would be considered essential
within the state.
On both substance and procedure, the move was surprising. The benchmark approach departed from the uniform, federal standard that the ACA
appears to anticipate and that many informed observers expected HHS to
adopt. And announcing the policy through an Internet bulletin came under
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immediate criticism because it allowed the agency to sidestep conventional
administrative procedures — including notice and comment, immediate
review in the courts, and OIRA oversight — notwithstanding the ACA’s
command that HHS ‘‘provide notice and an opportunity for public comment’’ on the deﬁnition of essential health beneﬁts (section 1302). By the
time HHS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on essential
health beneﬁts in November 2012, the deadline for states to submit their
proposed benchmark plans to the agency was already two months in the past.
What are we to make of this? The story of essential health beneﬁts offers
insight into the merits of using guidance documents; it is also interesting in
its own right, both because of the importance of the policy question and
because of HHS’s unexpected decision. In this essay, we explore two
questions. First, is the benchmark approach a lawful exercise of HHS’s
authority under the ACA? Although HHS has brushed up against the limits
of its discretionary authority, we conclude that the approach likely will
(and, in our view, should) be upheld in the event of a challenge. Second, did
HHS’s announcement of the benchmark approach through an Internet
bulletin allow the agency to sidestep the administrative procedures that are
meant to shape the exercise of its discretion? The answer, we believe, is
no. In fact, the agency’s unconventional process was more open to public scrutiny and external oversight than conventional rulemaking would
have been.
Deﬁning Essential Health Beneﬁts

Starting in 2014, the ACA requires new health insurance plans in the
individual and small-group markets to cover a minimum set of services that
the ACA terms ‘‘essential health beneﬁts.’’1 This requirement applies to
plans sold on state health insurance exchanges and to individual and smallgroup plans sold outside the exchanges. The statute (section 1302) enumerates ten different categories of services that essential health beneﬁts
must, at a minimum, include:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Ambulatory patient services
Emergency services
Hospitalization
Maternity and newborn care

1. Large-group plans, such as those provided by large employers, are not required to provide
essential health beneﬁts, although they are subject to a different set of requirements governing the
actuarial value of coverage.
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5. Mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment
6. Prescription drugs
7. Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices
8. Laboratory services
9. Preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management
10. Pediatric services, including oral and vision care
Many of these inclusions are signiﬁcant — for example, a more barebones approach might have excluded prescription drugs and pediatric
dental care—but the list, by design, leaves much detail to be speciﬁed by
subsequent regulation. For example, does the ‘‘habilitative services’’
category include behavioral treatment for autism, an expensive therapy
with mixed evidence of effectiveness (Reichow 2012)? What do ‘‘preventive
and wellness services’’ encompass beyond the ones that another provision of the ACA requires all plans to cover without cost sharing (sections
1001, 2713)?
Sensitive to the need for greater detail, the ACA instructs the secretary of
HHS to ﬂesh out the deﬁnition of essential health beneﬁts. Speciﬁcally, the
statute directs her to ‘‘ensure that the scope of the essential health beneﬁts . . . is equal to the scope of beneﬁts provided under a typical employer
plan, as determined by the Secretary.’’ Congress also instructed the secretary of the Department of Labor to survey insurance plans ‘‘to determine the beneﬁts typically covered by employers’’ and report back to
the secretary of HHS. ‘‘In deﬁning the essential health beneﬁts,’’ the statute further provides, ‘‘the Secretary shall provide notice and an opportunity for public comment’’ (section 1302).
In the normal course of regulatory events, HHS might have been
expected to launch an orderly rulemaking process not long after the ACA’s
enactment. It is hard to say exactly what a reasonable time frame for this
might have been, but the ACA required states to demonstrate to HHS by
January 2013 that they would have health insurance exchanges up and
running within a year. To make such a demonstration, states would have
to know well in advance about the scope of beneﬁts that plans on the
exchanges would have to cover. Working backward, a notice of proposed
rulemaking would probably have had to issue by the end of 2011, followed
by a ﬁnal rule in mid-2012, to have any hope of giving states the certainty
they needed to create their exchanges. That is not, however, what happened.
Shortly after the ACA’s enactment, HHS turned to the Institute
of Medicine (IOM) for ‘‘advice on a process and considerations the
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Department needs to take into account in its initial establishment of
[essential health beneﬁts] and in updating them over time’’ (IOM 2011a).
In other words, HHS asked the IOM not to deﬁne essential beneﬁts but
to offer suggestions on how HHS might do so. The IOM report was
expected to be completed in the fall of 2011. Enlisting help from the IOM
bought HHS time during which it might reasonably do nothing. Assuming
the agency was prepared to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking soon
after the release of the IOM report, the formal rulemaking process could
proceed on a time frame that would allow for meaningful interaction with
states and other interested parties—including insurers, health care providers, and consumer-advocacy groups — before bumping into deadlines
for health insurance exchanges.
The IOM tackled its assignment with dispatch, quickly convening an
expert panel to write a report recommending methods for determining and
updating essential beneﬁts. It also invited members of the public to submit
comments online, and held two public conferences, one in Washington,
DC, in January 2011 and another in Costa Mesa, California, in March 2011.
Featuring presentations from an impressive range of experts and stakeholders, these conferences were later summarized in a volume that the IOM
(2011b) released to the public.
Meanwhile, in April 2011, the Department of Labor delivered its report
on employer-sponsored coverage to HHS (Department of Labor 2011).
Unfortunately, the Department of Labor surveys on which the report was
based relied on ‘‘summary plan descriptions’’ that employers provide to
their workers—and those descriptions lack detailed information about
the scope of coverage for speciﬁc services. The report therefore gave HHS
little to guide its decision; it certainly provided no help on whether, say,
a ‘‘typical’’ employer plan covered behavioral treatment for autism.
The IOM went considerably further. On October 6, 2011, the expert
panel released a 256-page report recommending a method for determining essential beneﬁts (IOM 2011a). Somewhat controversially, the report
proposed a ‘‘premium target’’ approach in which a single national package
of essential beneﬁts would be tied to the cost of a typical beneﬁts package
in the small-group market. That national package would then be updated
over time to reﬂect innovation and public deliberation.
Following the release of the IOM report, the agency announced that it
would hold a series of ‘‘listening sessions’’ over the subsequent months.
These sessions—two-hour meetings at which members of the public
could share their opinions with HHS ofﬁcials—were conducted in each
of ten HHS-deﬁned regions. Sessions took place in Chicago, Boston,
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Philadelphia, Dallas, New York, Kansas City, Atlanta, Seattle, Denver, and,
ﬁnally, on the Monday before Thanksgiving, San Francisco.
Three and a half weeks later, reports began to circulate that HHS intended
to release a ‘‘prerule’’ on essential health beneﬁts, although the term prerule
created confusion. ‘‘Not even the most seasoned Washingtonians seem to
know what it means,’’ reported Politico (Feder and Millman 2011). Finally,
on December 16, 2011, the prerule was posted on HHS’s website with the
title ‘‘Essential Health Beneﬁts Bulletin’’ (CCIIO 2011).
Although the medium may have created some confusion, the bulletin’s
message was both concise and surprising. Rather than specify a uniform
national beneﬁts package, the bulletin proposed to allow states to choose a
‘‘benchmark plan’’ to deﬁne essential health beneﬁts. This approach was
modeled on how states choose beneﬁts under the State Children’s Health
Insurance Program, also known as SCHIP (KFF 2007). A modiﬁed version
of the same policy was introduced into Medicaid by the Deﬁcit Reduction
Act of 2005. Under the Medicaid version of the benchmark approach, states
were allowed to offer a modiﬁed set of beneﬁts, linked to a state-selected
benchmark, to some groups of adult Medicaid enrollees (KFF 2010).
Adapting the benchmark approach for essential health beneﬁts, the
bulletin proposed allowing each state to choose a ‘‘benchmark plan’’ from
a menu of options, including the three largest insurance plans in the state’s
small-group market and the three largest plans available to state employees. The default benchmark, for states that failed to select one, would be the
largest small-group plan in the state. Subject to adjustments to assure their
conformity with the ACA’s list of coverage requirements, these benchmark
plans would deﬁne essential beneﬁts within the states. At just thirteen
pages long, the bulletin provided few details. Additional information, the
bulletin suggested, would be forthcoming in the full-dress rulemaking
proceeding.
Responses to the Bulletin

The benchmark approach was front-page news, described by the New York
Times as a ‘‘major surprise’’ (Pear 2011). As we explain in greater detail
below, the ACA was drafted on the assumption that HHS would choose a
single, national deﬁnition of essential health beneﬁts. The Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce (CBO 2012: 8), for one important example, had scored it on
that assumption. Most expert observers had not seriously considered a
state-speciﬁc benchmark prior to the bulletin. And the IOM report never
mentioned the benchmark approach that the bulletin ultimately proposed,
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although it did offer a limited endorsement of the idea that states might
deviate from the national deﬁnition of essential beneﬁts, subject to
approval by HHS (IOM 2011a: 129).
Why did HHS take such an unanticipated approach to essential health
beneﬁts? Politics certainly played a role. The benchmark approach gave
states ﬂexibility at a time when many were complaining about the lack of
it. In addition—and although we lack the space here to thoroughly examine
the question—smart politics may have made for smart policy. Because
most health insurance plans ‘‘do not differ signiﬁcantly in the range of
services they cover’’ and ‘‘generally cover health care services in virtually
all of the 10 statutory categories,’’ no state could select a threadbare
benchmark plan that would thwart the ACA’s effort to guarantee the availability of comprehensive coverage (CCIIO 2011: 4). And tying local beneﬁts
to local market conditions would probably result in less distortion (i.e.,
greater efﬁciency) than if beneﬁts were required to be uniform.
The benchmark approach does create winners and losers. Because of the
way premium subsidies and tax-sharing credits are calculated, recipients
of subsidized coverage in states with generous beneﬁts will receive modestly more federal support than those in less generous states. But many
policies give rise to that kind of differential treatment; variation across
states is simply a feature of our federal system. Even John Ball, the chair of
the IOM panel that recommended tying essential health beneﬁts to a premium target, offered only gentle criticism of the benchmark approach.
‘‘Given where the department is coming from, giving ﬂexibility to the states
is a good thing,’’ he told Politico. ‘‘But I do think they missed an opportunity to take a crack at getting costs under control’’ (Millman 2011b).
Leading Republicans reacted much more harshly, not to the substance of
the policy but to the manner in which it was announced. In a letter to HHS,
ﬁve inﬂuential Republican senators and congressmen offered the following
objections:
By issuing a ‘‘bulletin’’ rather than a proposed rule, the administration
has sidestepped the requirement to publish a cost-beneﬁt analysis estimating the impact these mandates will have on health insurance premiums and the increased costs to the federal government. . . . The administration is not required to respond to comments received regarding
this ‘‘bulletin.’’ Publishing a ‘‘bulletin’’ rather than a proposed rule is the
antithesis of an ‘‘open and transparent’’ process. . . .
The bulletin also does not have the force of law and cannot, therefore,
be considered an indication of what the proposed or ﬁnal rule will decree.

448

Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law

Thus, states still have many unanswered questions and no more certainty
than they had before the ‘‘bulletin’’ was released. . . . It is unreasonable to
expect states to be ready to implement such draconian changes by 2014,
if the Administration is not even ready to issue a proposed rule on such an
integral part of the functioning of the law. (Enzi et al. 2012)
These concerns notwithstanding, the bulletin prompted many states
to launch their own administrative processes for selecting benchmark
plans. And that was the point: ‘‘By releasing the bulletin now,’’ the secretary of HHS explained, ‘‘we’re giving families, employers and states plenty
of time to take this information into account as they plan for the big
improvements the health care law will make to the insurance market in
2014’’ (Sebelius 2011). With very little time to go before the January 2013
deadline for demonstrating readiness to run an exchange, and other reformrelated tasks to complete at the same time, any state interested in running its
own exchange could not really afford to wait.
To be sure, some states declined to participate in this process. State
ofﬁcials cited the lack of guidance from HHS on essential health beneﬁts
and other exchange-related issues as one of their reasons. In September
2012, Michael Consedine, the insurance commissioner for the state of
Pennsylvania, stated in testimony before the Health Subcommittee of the
House Ways and Means Committee that ‘‘the lack of detailed information
from HHS has put Pennsylvania, and many other states, in a very difﬁcult
position. We are traveling down a road, directionless, while knowing the
road will end very soon—January 2014 is right around the bend.’’ Robert
Bentley (2012), the Republican governor of Alabama, was even more
pointed in a letter sent a month later to the secretary of HHS:
Your ofﬁce released essential health beneﬁts guidance on December 16,
2011, with the promise of more to come. It has yet to arrive. It has
become clear to me that the states have been left to decide the fate of their
insurance marketplaces with no additional guidance or regulations on
essential health beneﬁts. This places governors and other leaders in the
untenable position of making a critical decision based on little more than
vague guidance and guesswork. . . . I decline to make a decision on the
essential health beneﬁts benchmark plan. There is simply not enough
valid information available now to make an informed choice for such an
important decision.
Ultimately, twenty-seven states held a public comment period on the subject
of the benchmark plan as part of the selection process, and twenty-four
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states submitted their proposed benchmark plans to HHS by the October
1, 2012, deadline (Avalere Health 2012; Schwartz 2012). Alabama and
Pennsylvania were not among them.
On November 26, 2012—twenty days after the reelection of President
Barack Obama and almost a year after the release of the bulletin—HHS
published in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking on
essential health beneﬁts. The NPRM formally proposed the benchmark
approach that the bulletin had previewed. In its discussion of regulatory
alternatives, the NPRM (2012: 70,665) said,
At the request of some commenters, HHS considered one national
deﬁnition of [essential health beneﬁts] that would have applicable
issuers offer a uniform list of beneﬁts. However, this approach would not
allow for state ﬂexibility and issuer innovation in beneﬁt design, would
require a burdensome overhaul for issuers, and would disrupt the market.
These two sentences represent the entirety of the NPRM’s discussion of
the policy wisdom of the benchmark approach. The ﬁnal rule, issued on
February 25, 2013, deviated little, if at all, from the NPRM. On the possibility of a single national deﬁnition of essential health beneﬁts, the ﬁnal
rule repeated the two sentences from the NPRM that are quoted above,
without further elaboration (Final Rule 2013: 12,861).
Legality of the Benchmark Approach

Because the ACA does not explicitly contemplate a state-based benchmark approach to essential health beneﬁts, the question arises whether
the approach is consistent with statute. In other words, has the secretary
exceeded the bounds of her discretionary authority? Notwithstanding its
considerable importance, the question has received scant public attention.
HHS has not yet offered a legal defense of the benchmark approach, but
its argument will probably run something like this: where agencies interpret open-ended phrases through notice-and-comment rulemaking, courts
typically give agencies a lot of leeway. This practice is known as ‘‘Chevron
deference,’’ after the landmark case establishing it (Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 [1984]). Here Congress delegated to the
secretary of HHS broad authority to ﬂesh out the meaning of ‘‘essential
health beneﬁts.’’ Under Chevron, the secretary’s interpretation of the statutory
phrase will be upheld so long as that interpretation offers a reasonable
construction of the ACA. Nothing in the statute precludes the secretary
either from linking those beneﬁts to state health plans or from giving
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the states the ﬂexibility to select benchmark plans. Given congressional
silence on those points, the secretary’s exercise of her authority is fully
consistent with the ACA.
This argument is a powerful one. There are, however, two ways in which
the benchmark approach is arguably difﬁcult to square with the text of the
ACA. The ﬁrst is obvious. In a statute that attends carefully to the division
of regulatory labor between the federal government and the states, the ACA
repeatedly conﬁrms that ‘‘the Secretary shall deﬁne the essential health
beneﬁts’’ (section 1302). This is not casual language: in three separate
places in the same statutory section, the act contemplates that the secretary
would be the one ‘‘deﬁning’’ and then ‘‘revising’’ what counts as essential
health beneﬁts. The ACA even instructs the secretary to ‘‘ensure that the
scope of essential health beneﬁts . . . is equal to the scope of beneﬁts provided under a typical employer plan, as determined by the Secretary.’’
The phrase ‘‘as determined by the Secretary’’ would do no work unless it
was the secretary—not the states—doing the determining.
This objection, however, is not terribly persuasive. Although a federal
agency cannot delegate its powers to the states, it ‘‘may turn to an outside
entity for advice and policy recommendations, provided the agency makes
the ﬁnal decisions itself’’ (U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. F.C.C., 359 F.3d 554
[D.C. Cir. 2004]). Here the secretary gave the states a constrained set of
options (e.g., choose a benchmark plan from among the three largest smallgroup plans in the state) and retained the authority to select a benchmark
for any state that either does not pick a benchmark or chooses an inappropriate one (NPRM 2012: 70,667). As such, the secretary remains ﬁrmly
in control. Nothing in the ACA prevents her from deferring to states that
select benchmark plans from among the few options she has provided.
That choice to defer is itself an exercise of her delegated powers.
The second potential objection to the benchmark approach is both less
obvious and more substantial. Notwithstanding the secretary’s wide discretion to deﬁne essential health beneﬁts, there are limits to the deference
that courts afford to agencies that interpret open-ended statutory language.
As the D.C. Circuit has explained, the notion that an agency interpretation is permissible just because the statute in question ‘‘does not expressly
negate the existence of a claimed administrative power (i.e. when the
statute is not written in ‘thou shalt not’ terms), is both ﬂatly unfaithful to the
principles of administrative law . . . and refuted by precedent’’ (Ry. Labor
Executives’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655 [D.C. Cir. 1994]).
‘‘The question,’’ the Supreme Court has recently emphasized, ‘‘is always
whether the agency has gone beyond what Congress has permitted it to do’’
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(City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S.Ct. 1863 [2013]). In other words, agencies may ﬁll in statutory gaps—but only up to a point. Where an agency’s
interpretation of an open-ended provision clashes with the statutory scheme
as a whole, the courts will not presume that Congress meant to authorize the agency to so interpret the statute (Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S.
115 [1994]).
As we have discussed, the ACA was enacted on the assumption that
HHS would establish a nationally uniform slate of essential health beneﬁts.
Under the benchmark approach, however, there will now be dozens of
state-speciﬁc sets of essential health beneﬁts. Many provisions of the ACA
are inscrutable, extraneous, or impossible to implement in the face of
that kind of variation. Consider again, for example, the requirement that
essential health beneﬁts must be ‘‘equivalent to the scope of beneﬁts provided under a typical employer plan’’ (section 1302). How can a variable
roster of state-speciﬁc essential health beneﬁts be equivalent to the scope
of beneﬁts provided under ‘‘an’’ (which is to say, one) employer plan?
Nowhere is the problem more apparent than in provisions governing
state coverage mandates. Some states require insurers to cover speciﬁc
beneﬁts—for example, applied behavior analysis for autism or in vitro
fertilization services—that Congress anticipated might exceed what the
secretary would deem essential. Congress, however, did not want to devote
the tax credits and cost-sharing payments available on the exchanges to
the coverage of these state-mandated beneﬁts. The ACA therefore limits federal subsidies to defraying the costs of essential health beneﬁts
(section 1401). States must pick up the rest of the tab to assure that
exchange plans that include extra state-mandated beneﬁts remain affordable (section 1311).
Under the benchmark approach, however, this cost-sharing arrangement
becomes irrelevant. A state’s benchmark plan will inevitably cover the
treatments or services that the state has mandated. As such, a state’s essential health beneﬁts will by deﬁnition include all of the beneﬁts for which
the state mandates coverage. State coverage mandates can therefore never
exceed essential health beneﬁts, and states with extensive coverage mandates will never assume the additional costs that the ACA anticipates they
will assume. Did Congress really intend its cost-sharing provisions to do
no work at all?
The benchmark approach also raises questions about certain specialized
insurance plans that will be sold on the exchanges. For the most signiﬁcant
example, the ACA instructs the Ofﬁce of Personnel Management (OPM)
to enter into contracts with health insurers to sell at least two ‘‘multi-state
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plans’’ on each state exchange. Those insurers must ‘‘offe[r] a beneﬁts
package that is uniform in each State and consists of the essential [health]
beneﬁts’’ (section 10104). Where essential health beneﬁts vary from state
to state, however, a multistate plan cannot both be uniform and cover only
the essential health beneﬁts.
In proposing regulations for multistate plans, the OPM recognized this
problem. Its solution was to read the ‘‘uniform in each State’’ language to
require that ‘‘the beneﬁts for each [multistate plan] must be uniform within
a State, but not necessarily uniform among States’’ (NPRM 2012: 72,589).
The bare language of the uniformity provision is perhaps amenable to this
interpretation. Other statutory clues, however, suggest that Congress meant
uniformity among states. Congress speciﬁed, for example, that a state can
require a multistate plan to cover state-mandated beneﬁts, but only if the
state picks up the increased expense (section 10104). There would have
been no need for Congress to bless that limited inroad on uniformity among
the states if the ACA required uniformity only within each state.
In short, the benchmark approach to essential health beneﬁts ﬁts poorly
with a number of provisions of the ACA. That poor ﬁt raises the prospect
of a legal challenge: perhaps it suggests that HHS exceeded its delegated
powers in adopting the benchmark approach. In this, the claim is reminiscent of FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (529 U.S. 120
[2000]), where the Supreme Court rejected the FDA’s effort to assert
jurisdiction over tobacco. If the FDA could regulate tobacco products, the
Court reasoned, the agency’s statutory mandate to assure that such products were ‘‘safe’’ would require the FDA to ban cigarettes outright. The
Court thought it unimaginable that Congress meant to arm the FDA
with that sweeping power. The agency countered by arguing that it could
continue to allow cigarettes to be sold because banning them would cause a
shift to dangerous black-market cigarettes, harming overall public health.
The Court rejected this public health interpretation as ‘‘incompatible’’
with several other provisions of the statute that asked the agency to weigh
the therapeutic beneﬁts and potential harms of individual products—not
to address general questions of public health. The benchmark approach is
subject to similar criticism for its incompatibility with provisions of the
ACA that anticipate a single, uniform standard for essential health beneﬁts.
In the ﬁnal estimation, however, demonstrating the unlawfulness of
HHS’s approach requires more than showing that its interpretation aligns
awkwardly with scattered provisions of the ACA. The question remains
whether the ﬁt is so poor that it justiﬁes the inference that Congress could
not have meant to allow HHS to interpret the ACA in the manner that it did
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(California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. F.E.R.C., 372 F.3d 395 [D.C.
Cir. 2004]). We think not, although the question is close. Unlike Brown &
Williamson, this is not a case where HHS has exploited statutory ambiguity in an effort to intrude into regulatory domains that Congress never
intended it to enter (American Bar Ass’n v. F.T.C., 430 F.3d 457 [D.C. Cir.
2005]). The agency has just chosen to involve the states in deﬁning a statutory term that Congress gave it wide latitude to deﬁne. Congress may not
have contemplated that HHS would adopt a benchmark approach, but so
what? Agencies routinely discharge their statutory obligations in ways that
Congress never anticipated, particularly in complex and fast-changing
regulatory environments.
While HHS’s interpretation does ﬁt uneasily with several provisions of
the ACA, the agency could always shift course, and provisions that do no
work today may be crucial tomorrow. More importantly, the interpretation
of a complex statute is a messy business. Some statutory provisions will
inevitably prove less signiﬁcant than they would have been under alternative readings. An agency’s choice is not usually deﬁcient for that reason
alone (Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515
U.S. 687 [1995]). Something more than the statutory tension that the
secretary’s interpretation creates—something closer to the incompatibility found in Brown & Williamson—would be necessary to conclude that
Congress meant to preclude HHS from establishing essential health beneﬁts with reference to state benchmarks.
Process-Based Concerns

Setting aside the legality of the benchmark approach, the fact remains that
HHS used a guidance document—a thirteen-page bulletin posted on its
website—to announce its new policy. As is typically the case with such
a policy statement, the bulletin nowhere committed the agency to the
approach that it outlined. As a formal legal matter, it had no more significance than an advance notice of proposed rulemaking or a press release.
Why, then, was this ‘‘atypical approach’’so ‘‘widely criticized’’ (Cassidy
2011)? Given the looming deadlines for the exchanges, states and insurers
understood that the benchmark approach outlined in the bulletin was not
just one possibility among many. It was almost certainly the rule. HHS said
as much when, in a call with reporters on the day the bulletin issued, agency
ofﬁcials categorically rejected any suggestion that they might change their
mind and bluntly said, ‘‘This is our intended regulatory approach’’ (Glied
2011). More signiﬁcantly, the agency began the traditional rulemaking
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process required under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) after the
states’ deadline for selecting benchmark plans had passed and after insurers started developing new insurance products for the exchanges.
The federal courts have a practice of asking whether policy statements,
although they nominally lack the force of law, are nonetheless binding as a
practical matter (Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 [D.C.
Cir. 1987]). Where policy statements have such binding effect, they can be
deemed ‘‘legislative rules’’ and, if challenged, invalidated for failure to go
through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Although the line separating
policy statements from legislative rules is not crisp (Gersen 2007: 1712),
two factors are especially important in suggesting that the line has been
crossed: ﬁrst, when the policy statement has ‘‘present effect’’ by imposing
‘‘obligations’’ on the regulated community; and second, when the policy
statement does not ‘‘genuinely’’ afford the agency the opportunity to
change its mind (American Bus Assoc. v. United States, 627 F.2d 525 [D.C.
Cir. 1980]). Judged by this standard, the bulletin arguably became a legislative rule once states, insurers, and employers realized that they had no
choice but to conform to it and HHS had no time left to rethink it.
The bulletin, however, did not go through the formal rulemaking process. From this perspective, HHS’s procedural approach—a bulletin, followed by a long wait and then a hurried notice-and-comment session—
seems to conﬁrm the fears of those who worry that agencies will use
guidance to avoid administrative procedures and, at low cost and with
relative ease, dictate to regulated entities how they must order their affairs
(Anthony 1992).
But what, exactly, did the use of guidance allow HHS to avoid? We
consider three procedural requirements that would have applied in a conventional rulemaking setting, but to which the bulletin, as a guidance
document, was not subject: notice and comment, immediate judicial
review, and OIRA review. What is most notable about HHS’s unorthodox
process, however, is not that the agency avoided these procedures. It is that
the agency voluntarily subjected itself to most of the obligations that
adherence to the procedures would have entailed.
Notice and Comment

The APA’s notice-and-comment process is meant to allow for public
feedback on proposed rules, to supply agencies with information that can
aid them in revising those rules, and to publicly legitimate the rules they
ﬁnally adopt (Breyer et al. 2002: 658). Notice and comment, however, can
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serve those purposes only if agencies are open to revisiting their proposed rules when they receive feedback. In the case of essential beneﬁts,
HHS committed itself to the benchmark approach long before issuing its
notice of proposed rulemaking. That transformed the comment period—at
least with respect to the high-level policy choice of whether to adopt the
state-based benchmark approach — into an empty formality. HHS’s curt
dismissal in the ﬁnal rule of comments suggesting a single, nationwide
standard may have signaled its unwillingness at that late stage even to
entertain the possibility.
Still, it does not appear that HHS used the bulletin to avoid public
feedback on the benchmark approach. Well before issuing the bulletin,
HHS held a number of well-attended ‘‘listening sessions’’ where it sought
views from states, insurers, providers, and consumer representatives.
Additionally, starting in April 2010, HHS held weekly calls with state
ofﬁcials about implementation of the ACA, calls that informed its thinking
about essential health beneﬁts (NPRM 2012: 70,667). Around the same
time, HHS also made it known to outside groups that it was toying with the
idea of delegating authority to the states to establish their own essential health beneﬁts. That provoked a consortium of about six dozen public interest groups, led by the National Health Law Program (NHeLP), to
submit a lengthy letter to HHS — four months before the bulletin was
issued — objecting preemptively to any sort of state-based approach
(NHeLP 2011). These public discussions and the responses they engendered came on top of both the conferences that the IOM had organized and
the notice-and-comment processes that twenty-seven states used to select
their benchmark plans.
The agency had no obligation to do any of this public outreach. Without
informing anyone of its thinking, HHS could simply have issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking announcing the benchmark approach. After receiving comments and issuing a ﬁnal rule, HHS would then have complied with
all of the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. Paradoxically, however, formal compliance might have undermined HHS’s effort to seek and
receive meaningful public input on its proposed approach. Because courts
insist that agencies provide a fulsome explanation of the basis for their
proposed rules, HHS would have had to elaborate its benchmark approach
in a lengthy notice of considerable speciﬁcity (Elliott 1992: 1494). HHS
could then have discarded that approach only if it went through the laborious process of issuing a new notice of proposed rulemaking (Int’l Union,
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d
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1250 [D.C. Cir. 2005]). But with statutory deadlines looming, the agency
could have ill afforded the delay associated with restarting the notice-andcomment process.
Instead, HHS used the bulletin to secure public input during the brief
window where it could have reconsidered the benchmark approach.
Although agencies do not have to solicit feedback on guidance documents,
the bulletin’s very ﬁrst sentence explicitly invited comments from the public. In response, the agency received more than eleven thousand comments
(NPRM 2012: 70,646). HHS did not respond publicly to those comments,
as the APAwould have required in connection with a rulemaking. But HHS
surely understood that the comments it received would preview the concerns voiced during the ofﬁcial notice-and-comment process—and that it
would have to address those comments in issuing a ﬁnal rule. Nor does it
seem that the absence of a requirement to publish comments received in
response to the bulletin silenced any criticism. Just as the Internet allowed
HHS to make the bulletin immediately available to the public, the Internet allowed commenters to publicize their concerns. A number of advocacy
groups and state governments—like NHeLP and the ofﬁcials in Alabama
and Pennsylvania—did just that.
Posting the bulletin was an ingenious way to invite public comment
without irrevocably committing the agency to the benchmark approach.
The bulletin served as a trial balloon—an effort to see if the approach
would provoke the sort of outcry or incisive criticism that called for a
change in thinking. If there was cause for serious concern, the informality of the prenotice process—in contrast to the rigidity of notice-andcomment rulemaking—would have afforded the agency an opportunity to
quickly shift course. When reports surfaced just a week after the bulletin
issued that ‘‘there was no backlash’’ to speak of, HHS learned something
valuable about the acceptability of its chosen approach (Millman 2011a).
From the perspective of meaningfully involving the public in agency
decision making, then, the bulletin-followed-by-rulemaking approach was
superior to a routine process of APA notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Signiﬁcantly, it cleared a route for the agency to receive public comment
at the critical prenotice phase of agency rulemaking. Commentators regularly lament that well-organized groups with concentrated interests have
better access than diffuse public interest groups to this prenotice process
where most important choices are made (Elliott 1992: 1492). The bulletin
addressed this imbalance by telling everyone that the agency was open to
hearing from them.
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Judicial Review

By using a guidance document to announce the benchmark approach, HHS
also arguably circumvented judicial review. Per section 702 of the APA,
ﬁnal rules issued through notice-and-comment rulemaking can usually be
challenged in court by those whose conduct the rule affects. In contrast,
challenging guidance is much more difﬁcult. Courts often conclude either
that guidance is not ﬁnal agency action or that it is not ripe for review
(Mendelson 2007: 411). Perhaps the perceived difﬁculty with challenging
guidance—and the expectation that the agency would soon resort to rulemaking, mooting any challenge that might be brought to the guidance—
explains why no one tried to invalidate the bulletin.
One purpose of judicial review is to assure that agencies do not force
regulated interests to comply with rules that agencies lack the authority to
issue (Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 [1967]). It is therefore arguably worrisome that states, employers, and insurers did not have
an opportunity to challenge HHS’s benchmark approach before making
costly efforts to conform to that approach. Had HHS issued a proposed
rule instead of the bulletin, the agency could have ﬁnalized the rule sometime in 2012 or early 2013. A more regular process would therefore have
given affected interests an opportunity to challenge the ﬁnal rule before
the requirement to cover essential health beneﬁts sprang into force in
January 2014.
There is something to this—but not much. The benchmark approach
embodied in the bulletin will not evade preenforcement review altogether.
At most, HHS’s decision to outline its approach in a bulletin allowed the
agency to delay the date on which it issued a ﬁnal rule. Now that the ﬁnal
rule has issued, someone will probably bring a preenforcement challenge.
Perhaps the plaintiff will be the mother of an autistic child who can ﬁnd
no insurance plan in her state that covers needed services but who believes
that, had the agency gone through the process of establishing a uniform
federal standard, HHS might have included such services in the package of essential health beneﬁts. Or perhaps it will be a California insurance company complaining that it must cover acupuncture services. The
important point is that HHS knew when it issued the bulletin that any ﬁnal
rule adopting the benchmark approach would eventually be challenged.
The agency’s choice was therefore disciplined by the near-certainty that
the courts would one day scrutinize that choice. HHS’s reliance on the
bulletin just delayed when judicial review would occur.
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Nor is it especially worrisome that some states and insurers had to take
immediate steps to comply with the approach HHS outlined in the bulletin.
Even in the absence of ﬁnal agency action, parties often structure their
affairs in anticipation of governmental action. Earlier review might have
avoided some sunk costs: if the benchmark approach is invalidated, the
efforts of states to select benchmark plans and of insurers to fashion new
insurance products will have been wasted. Yet states and insurers could
always have challenged the bulletin on the ground that it was a legally
binding legislative rule. More signiﬁcantly, there is no guarantee that HHS
would have ﬁnalized its rule any more promptly had it issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking instead of a bulletin. The agency might still have
waited until the eleventh hour, devoting scarce resources to other pressing
problems associated with implementation of the ACA. Against this backdrop, the notion that HHS used the bulletin to avoid judicial scrutiny is
something of a stretch.
OIRA Review

Pursuant to Executive Order 12866, most important agency regulations are
subject to OIRA review. Guidance documents are not. Late in his administration, President George W. Bush did issue an order subjecting guidance
documents to OIRA review because they might otherwise ‘‘not receive the
beneﬁt of careful consideration accorded under the procedures for regulatory development and review’’ (OMB 2007: 3432). President Obama
(2009), however, rescinded that order shortly after taking ofﬁce. Although
a memorandum from his budget director clariﬁed that signiﬁcant guidance
documents remain subject to review (Orszag 2009), review of guidance is
in practice unsystematic and spotty (Nou 2013).
Perhaps, then, HHS used a guidance document to sidestep the centralized oversight that is supposed to enhance the rationality and democratic legitimacy of agency decision making. In particular, because OIRA
enforces the requirement that agencies undertake a rigorous, transparent
regulatory impact analysis prior to taking signiﬁcant actions, resorting to
guidance allowed the agency to delay for more than a year any public effort
to assess the costs and beneﬁts of the benchmark approach.
But did the delay of the regulatory impact analysis matter in practice?
Some scholars have questioned whether such analysis has much effect at all
on regulation (Hahn and Tetlock 2008). In the case of essential beneﬁts, the
delay in releasing the analysis may have been particularly inconsequential.
Neither the analysis accompanying the NPRM in November 2012 nor the
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one accompanying the ﬁnal rule in February 2013 even bothered to estimate how costs and beneﬁts might have differed if HHS had chosen a
national, uniform deﬁnition of essential health beneﬁts. Had it done so,
that would probably not have made much of a difference to the estimated impacts. Because the scope of beneﬁts under employer plans
varies little across states, giving states the authority to select benchmark
plans does not greatly affect the scope of the obligation to cover essential
health beneﬁts. The delay in providing a regulatory impact analysis, then,
seems of little consequence.
More generally, considerable evidence suggests that HHS did not ‘‘go
rogue’’ and use guidance to evade presidential oversight. For one thing,
HHS did share its bulletin with the White House. OIRA’s website reports
that it received the bulletin from HHS on December 14, 2011, and cleared
it (with some revisions) two days later—the same day HHS released it
(OIRA 2011). Sources inside the administration have conﬁrmed that White
House involvement ran much deeper. Administration ofﬁcials were consulted about the benchmark approach as early as the summer of 2011,
more than ﬁve months before the bulletin was issued. This close involvement is unsurprising. Deciding what counts as essential health beneﬁts is
perhaps the single most consequential policy choice that HHS will make
in connection with the implementation of President Obama’s signal legislative achievement. As a matter of practical politics, HHS had no choice
but to vet the bulletin at the very highest levels.
Discussion

At ﬁrst blush, HHS’s release of a terse bulletin to announce a major regulatory decision looks unusual, even improper. It seems to reinforce the
concern that agencies routinely use guidance documents to establish
binding rules while evading the procedural obstacles that might otherwise
deter them from acting (House Committee on Government Reform 2000).
And it appears to conﬁrm the wisdom of the academic consensus that guidance documents should be tolerated only grudgingly. Banning all guidance
would be imprudent—better that regulated entities have some inkling of
how agencies will carry out their duties than that they have none—but
too much guidance risks undermining the procedural regularity of the
administrative state (Mendelson 2007: 413; Raso 2010: 787).
This consensus, however, rests on an unﬂattering view of administrative
motivation. On this view, agencies are staffed not by public ofﬁcials anxious to ensure that their choices are workable and publicly legitimate but
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by bureaucrats trying to avoid procedural obstacles that stand in the way of
doing what they think is best. Guidance is tempting precisely because it
allows those bureaucrats to avoid the sort of public input, judicial review,
and executive oversight that, by fostering accountability to a broader
public, could impede their efforts. To put it in terms more familiar to political scientists: to the extent that administrative procedures allow political
principals to better control their agents (McCubbins et al. 1987), agencies
will use guidance to evade those procedures and exploit the slack between
them and their principals.
Doubtless this accurately describes some agencies some of the time. But
what then should we make of the fact that HHS voluntarily replicated the
very procedures that guidance is supposed to let it avoid? The agency
may not have been driven only by a desire to secure public input on the
benchmark approach—other motivations surely shaped the unusual regulatory process—but it is hard to conclude that the turn to guidance was a
ploy to avoid accountability. What is more, HHS is hardly alone in adopting
more administrative procedures than strictly necessary. Croley documents
a series of important rulemakings from the late 1990s and early 2000s,
including the EPA’s imposition of stringent controls on ozone and particulate matter, the FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco products, and the Forest
Service’s efforts to curtail road building in national forests. Although not
a representative sampling, Croley’s (2008: 160) examples ‘‘would all
unquestionably make a short list of some of the most signiﬁcant regulatory
activity in more than a decade.’’ And in every case, the agency ‘‘provided
more notice, data, and opportunities for participation tha[n] the APA (or
any other legal authority) demanded’’ (ibid.). Mendelson (2007: 425)
similarly identiﬁes a number of agencies that make a habit of soliciting
public input on guidance documents in the absence of legal compulsion to
do so.
In other words, there is nothing especially unusual about what HHS has
done here. Far from ducking procedural obligations wherever possible,
agencies sometimes embrace them. Why? At least for salient policy questions of substantial importance — a small but critical slice of agency
action—agencies have a number of incentives having little or nothing to
do with formal legal requirements to secure public input and ensure
political oversight. Doing so provides the agencies with technical information that might otherwise be difﬁcult to obtain about how to craft policies that are capable of implementation. It arms them with scientiﬁc data
that can help them better calibrate their rules. It teaches them about the
political acceptability — and hence long-term sustainability — of the
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regulatory initiative. It identiﬁes wellsprings of potential political support
for (and opposition to) the rulemaking. It lends legitimacy to the regulatory
initiative by ensuring that all interested parties have had the opportunity to
be heard both at the agency and in the courts. And it eases the concerns of
those who worry that the agency is regulating by ﬁat. In sum, procedures
can improve the workability and legitimacy of agency rules while protecting them from judicial or political attack (Croley 2008: 259).
Conclusion

What, if anything, does this essential health beneﬁts case study teach us about
the future process of ACA implementation? We close with three observations.
First, the intensely politicized nature of health reform will color anything
and everything connected to implementing health care reform. The essential health beneﬁts rule, for example, was issued against a backdrop of
ﬁerce partisan tension. The Supreme Court had agreed just a month before
HHS posted the bulletin that it would consider a constitutional challenge to
the so-called individual mandate—a challenge that, if successful, could
have brought down the rest of the law with it. At the same time, governors
and other state ofﬁcials hostile to health reform were bridling at what many
perceived as heavy-handed federal implementation efforts. Although we
have chosen not to dwell on this political conﬂict, it would be naive to
suggest that politics played no role in HHS’s decision making. It would be
equally naive to think it will play no role going forward.
Second, ACA implementation will continue to depend on guidance. Part
of the reason is the sheer volume of regulation that implementing the ACA
requires. The Department of Health and Human Services, the Treasury
Department, the Labor Department, and the other implementing agencies
face daunting challenges rolling out the various programs that the ACA
establishes. It is unrealistic to expect that each regulation will chart a clean
course through the APA rulemaking process. Equally important, the digital
revolution may itself encourage a turn to guidance. Long gone are the days
when proposed rules were only put ‘‘on display’’ at the Ofﬁce of the Federal
Register—when there was a single point of ofﬁcial interaction between the
regulators and the regulated. Agencies can now communicate directly with
the public in ways that the formal regulatory process never envisioned. A
vast literature considers how technology is transforming the relationship
between government and its citizens (Mendelson 2011). Using the Internet
to publicize guidance is an excellent example of this phenomenon.
Third, the case study illuminates the larger debate about agency guidance. If agencies sometimes have powerful incentives to adhere voluntarily
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to administrative procedures, the distrust of guidance that runs like a leitmotif through much of the literature on administrative law seems misplaced. This is not to deny that agencies use guidance to avoid the costs of
adhering to burdensome procedural requirements. Of course they do. That is
why issuing guidance is attractive to begin with. But do agencies systematically use guidance to avoid scrutiny from the public, the courts, and the
president? The story of essential health beneﬁts suggests that such evasion is
far from inevitable. Nor does the available empirical evidence—slim as it
is—lend support to the story. A recent review of signiﬁcant guidance documents issued by ﬁve agencies over the span of a decade ﬁnds no indication
that agencies routinely use guidance to shirk public accountability (Raso
2010). Perhaps, then, administrative lawyers should temper the reﬂexive
assumption that agencies turn to guidance to avoid answering for their
actions. It may be worth exploring the possibility that agencies are often
sincere about what they use guidance for: to give regulated entities insight
into their thinking, to shape how line ofﬁcials carry out their duties, and
even—as with essential health beneﬁts—to spur a public debate about the
wisdom of a regulatory approach.
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